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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH

ST'ATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
Case No.
17342

-vs.THEODORE SAMUEL PACHECO,
Appellant.

STATEl\fENT

O:B~

CASE

The appellant, The·odore Samuel Pacheco, was
charged and convicted of grand larceny and second
degree burglary, in violation of 76-38-1-4, U.C.A. 1953,
and 76-9-3, U.C.A. 1953, respectively, in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, on 3 May,
1961, and no\Y appeals from that conviction.
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A verdict finding the appellant guilty of the crimes
of grand larceny and second degree burglary was returned by the jury on 3 May, 1961, and appellant was
committed to the State Prison on 4 May, 1961.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the convictions alleging
the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction of
larceny, and that the burglary conviction should he
vitiated by virtue of juror misconduct and a claim of
entrapment; the State contends no basis for reversal
exists of record.
ST'ATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, State of Utah, will adopt the appellant's Statement of Facts, but \vill supplement the statement in rebuttal to the points of argument raised by
the appellant where necessary for clarification.
STATENIENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
LARCENY CONVICTION.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT LET THE JURY SEPARATE
AFTER DELIBERA'TION, AND THE APPELLANT HAS
WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO OBJECT.
POINT III.
NO EVIDENCE OF ENTRAPMENT EXISTS WARRANTING REVERSAL.

2
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ARGlT:MENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
LARCENY CONVICTION.

The appellant contends that there is insufficient
evidence of record to sustain the conviction of larceny
of the nwney from the Payless Builders Supply Co.
The basis of the contention is that there is no showing
that the appellant had possession of any of the money
at the time he was searched at the ·scene. It appe,ars
that the trial judge denied the appellant's motion to
dismiss on the theory that the accomplices' possession
was sufficient. (R. 123). The defendant contends that
since one of the appellant's co-participants, Gerald D.
Shelton, did not intend to commit a crime, that his
acts cannot be in1puted to the appellant and, therefore,
the evidence of possession is not sufficient of record.
At the outset it is to he noted that exclusive, conscious "possession," as such, is not itself an element of
the crime of larceny, but is merely evidentiary under
76-38-1, U.C.A. 1953, of the required element of the
"taking'' of possession. The possession is indicative
of the asportation and the taking of possession, which
are the essential elements of larceny. People v. Gillis,
6 Utah 84, 21 Pac. -!0-± (1889); Clark & 11arshall, Crimes,
6th Ed. (1958), p. 706, et seq. The absence of possession
also may be son1e indication of the absence of taking
possession. The cases of Sta,te v. Dyett, 114 Utah 379,
199 P.2d 153 (1948) and State v. Brooks, 101 Utah 584,
126 P.2d 1044 (19-±2), cited by the appellant, are material
3
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only if possession is the only evidence of record sufficient
to show an actual taking by the appellant. The record
shows that Gerald' D. Shelton testified to the appellant's
taking possession of some of the money; he testified
as follows: (R.177).

"Q.
A.

Now there was a small cash box, a metal cash
box there, was there not~
Yes, there was.

* * *
Q. Who opened that cash box~
A.

I think Markham tried to open it. I had my
hack turned because Ted was going through
some papers in this other drawer. I think
~1:arkham tried to open it and I was holding
it when he opened it.

Q. Did you open that cash box~
A.

No, I did not.

Q. Did you take any money out of it and give it
to Markham~
A.

I took a bunch of envelopes out of it that Ted
said there was son1e money in, and Markham
took smne of it and Ted took so1ne of it and
I took some of it.''

Thus the evidence directly shows that smne of the money
was actually taken by the appellant. The appellant oontends that since there was no showing at the time he was
searched by the police at the pre1nises burglarized, that
he had possession of any of the 1noney, that it indicates
a non-taking. This is not adequately supported by the
record, for at the time the appellant was searched, the
police were not looking for any money, but rather for a
4
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weapon. Thus, David T. llill, a private policeman, testified: (R. 97).

'' Q.

A.

Now you indicated that you, together with
another officer, did have the occasion to
search the defendant in this case~
That's correct.

Q. And is it also your testimony that you found
only a small pocket knife together with some
keys~

A.

No-I didn't say keys. The only thing, as I
recall, that I took off the man was the small
pocket knife. I don't remember exactly how
long it was. It was a small pocket knife. I
don't even remember how many blades. The
only thing I tvas looking for at the time-and
I shook him good-was some type of toeapon.
That was the only thing I took from the
fellow.''

In addition, Officer Don G. Ferguson testified that
he only "frisked" the appellant. (R. 121). The~refore,
there is nothing to overwhelmingly rebut Gerald D. Shelton's testimony that the appellant took some of the
money. Even if it is assu1ned that at the time he was
searched he had none of the $124.67 that was taken in
his possession, it still does not rebut the taking, since he
could have gotten rid of it or given it to the third accomplice, Johnny l\[arkham. This would have been sufficient
asportation to satisfy that element of the crime. People
v. Gillis, supra; Clark & ::Marshall, Crimes, 6th Ed. (1958),
p. 738. Under these circumstances, the evidence of taking
possession is sufficient to sustain the conviction.

5
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Even if it were determined that the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate an actual taking of a sufficient amount for grand larceny by the appellant himself,
it is submitted that the trial court correctly ruled on the
issue of in1puting the conduct of the accomplices to the
appellant. In People v. Collins, 53 Cal. 185 (1878), the
court held that one who merely pretends to aid another
in order to get evidence is not guilty of burglary and an
entry by that person cannot be in1puted to the other. In
People v. Lanzit, 70 Cal. App. 498, 233 Pac. 816 (1924),
the court said, with reference to imputation of conduct by
a feigned accomplice to an accused:
"It is of course necessary that the defendant
should have directly participated in so much of
the entire transaction that the acts which he himself personally committed shall alone b€ sufficient
to n1ake out a complete offense against the law;
for no act of the feigned accon1plice may he imputed to hin1, and if in order to constitute the offense, it is necessary that smnething done by the
supposed confederate shall be imputed to the accused, then the prosecution will fail."
To the same effect is State 'C. J an.sen, 22 Kan. 498,
and in United States v. Buck, 3 U.S:C.nl.A. 3±1, 12 C:M.:R
97 (1953), Chief Justice Quinn writing the opinion for
the Court of Military Appeals, said:
''It is necessary to show that he participated
in every essential act necessary to constitute the
cri1ne, howeve.r, for obviously no act of the decoy
can be i1npu,ted to him, because they do not share
a cmnmon criminal intent or purpose. The one
intends a crime, while the other seeks only to
apprehend the criminal."

6
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See also Perkins, Criminal Law, p. 921-2.
The essential factor of these cases is that the acts
of a decoy or fejgned accornplice may not be imputed
to the defendant. In this case, the acts of Gerald D. Shelton cannot be irnputed to the appellant under this theory;
however, Johnny J\{arkham was not a feigned accomplice
or decoy; he was an actual accomplice with the appellant,
and, hence, because appellant and Markham had a comnlon purpose and intent, their acts are imputable to each
other. By the appellant's own testimony (R. 157), he
and Markham intended to take money from the Payless
Builders Supply and entered for that purpose. There was
a tmity of intent and action between appellant and Markham, and appellant testified the money was given to
Markham. (R. 158). 'Vhen Markham was searched, the
sum of $80.70 was taken from him (R.109), and the above
quoted testimony of Shelton and appellant's own testiInony supports J\Iarkham having taking some of the Payless money. Since 1farkham's actions are not those of the
decoy, they may be imputed to appellant and suffice to
support the conviction for larceny.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT LE'T THE JURY SEPARATE
AFTER DELIBERATION, AND THE APPELLANT HAS
WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO OBJECT.

The appellant's contention that the court allowed
the jury to separate after submission of the case to the
jury is not \Yell taken for it assumes that the case was

I
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in fact submitted to the jury prior to their separation for
lunch.
The only reference in the record to the alleged separation of the jury shows that after the charge and argu-:
ments of counsel, the court addressed the jury as follows:
(R. 204).
''T·HE COURT: J\frs. Gunn, and gentlemen
of the jury, as you have observed I am trying two
cases here in effect at once. I have this other
coming at two o'clock and I have to have a noon
hour, and in order to have it I can't wait here
while you are deliberating. So I am going to excuse you for your noon hour. I'm going to excuse
you until 1 :30 this afternoon and ask that you
return at that time, and that you very carefully
keep in mind your conduct, as I have indicated
is your duty, and at that time I will send you out
to deliberate on the issues in this matter."
No objection to the court's actions was voiced by the
appellant. 77-31-27, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"The jurors sworn to try a cri1ninal action
Inay, at any time before the subn1ission of the
case to the jury, in the discretion of the court be
permitted to separate or be kept in charge by a
proper officer."
The in1portant part of the statute is the word "submission." If the case is aut01natically submitted to the
jury after charge and argun1ent, without further action
of the court, then the appellant's contention that separation occurred after submission may be correct. However, if submission of the case does not occur until the
judge directs the jury to their deliberations, then the jury
8
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in the instant case could not have been said to have separated subsequent to sub1nission. It is submitted that 7731-32, U.C.A. 1953, does not support a contention that
the Legislature dee1ned the case submitted on completion
of the charge, but rather the statute merely recognizes
that under Utah practice the charge usually is the last
ad preceding the jury's deliberation.
77-32-1, U.C.A. 1953 seems to recognize that the trial
is still in progress until the jury retires for deliberation.
77-32-1-4, U.C.A. 1953, are equally as susceptible to the
contention that the ease must be submitted by the judge
to the jury for deliberation as is 77-31-32, U.C.A. 1953
to the contrary. It is submitted that the Legislature,
in 77-31-27, U.C.A. 1953, by using the word" submission,"
meant that ti1ne of the trial that the judge surrenders
the matter to the jury's determination. The danger of
influence is no greater before commencing delibHration
just because the charge has been given than prior thereto. The real danger sought to be avoided is outside influence upon the jury, and after commencement of deliberations, the chance for harm is greatest. As is noted
in 21 ALR 2d 1093, "the trend of the decisions is away
from a strict and technical approach to the question."
Once the jury has entered into deliberations the minds
and views of the jurors are expressed, and influence
at this time may result in over-emphasis of evidence,
or coercion, that could persuade the jury to a result where
prior to deliberation they have no dominion over the
result, and communications are less susceptible to causing
mass coercion or influence. Therefore, it is contended
that a case should not be deemed submitted until court

9
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directs the jury to enter into its deliberations. This accords with decisions from other states; thus as was noted
in 34 A.L.R. 1210 :
"A case is finally submitted to the jury, within the meaning of a statute forbidding their separation when the case is finally submitted, at such
time as the court directs the jury to enter upon its
de1iberations and not necessarily at the conclusion
of the charge of the court to them.''
See also 21 ALR 2d 1139 ; 79 ALR 836.
77-31-27, U.C.A. 1953, allows separation at any time
"before the subn1ission of the case to the jury.'' In State
v. Ferrell, 69 Ohio St. 69 N.E. 995 (1903), the Ohio Supreme Court had a case before it similar to the one now
before the court. The court, in that case, allowed the jury
after receiving the charge, to go for their noon meal. The
Ohio Appellate Court found no error. In commenting
on an Ohio statute similar to that of Utah, the Ohio
Court said:
''We think the natural inference is that it was
intended to ren1ove the iron clad rule and leave
s01ne discretion in the trial judge as to when he
would finally submit the case."

In State v. 1-1 endricks, 32 I{an. 559, 4 Pac. 1050 and
State v. JJ1cKimney, 31 I{an. 570, 3 Pac. 356, the court
said it \vas not error to allo-vv the jury to separate at any
time before committed to the custody of the bailiff.
It is admitted that a split of authority exists in this
area, 23A CJS, Criminal Law, p. 959, and some authority
exists to support appellant's contention. Page v. State,
10
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______ Old. Cr ....... , 332 P.:2d G93 (1958). However, it is submitted that onl~· h~· holding that submission is accomplished upon the court directing the jury to commence
deliberations can the trial judge maintain adequate control over the trial, and avoid unforeseen problems that
1nay require additional attention after the charge, but
before deliberation.
It is sub1nitted that even if it were deemed error in
the instant case to have allowed the jury to separate
for lunch, the appellant nmy not now complain since no
objection \vas raised either by appellant or counsel to the
separation. Counsel had full opportunity to object, both
before and after separation, but no objection was voiced.
In such circumstances as this, the courts have recognized that an accused cannot sit back and acquiesce in
the separation and thereafter claim error. Abbott, Criminal Trial Pracice, 4th Ed., Sec. 691. In VVharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Sec. 2108, it is said:

"Ordinarily the defendant must make prompt
objection to the separation or he will be deemed to
have \\·aived any objection thereto."
A substantial a1nount of authority has recognized
the necessity of counsel or the accused to object. 21 ALR
2d 1149. In Walker v. State, 71 Ga. App. 38, 29 S.E. 2d
819 (1944), it was held that the defendant's failure to object operated as an implied consent where the jury was
allowed to go to hmch after submission.
In Keith '0·. Conmwnu.;ealth, ______ Ky ....... , 243 S.W.
293 (1922), the J(entucky Court of Appeals had a claim
11
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of error before it where the trial court allowed the jury
to separate for the noon meal; in holding the right to
complain to have been waived, the court said:

~

''If appellant had objected to the separation
of the jury at the time the court allowed it, or if
he had moved the court at any time before verdict
for a discharge of the jury, it would have been
reversible error to have overruled the objection
and motion. IIaving failed to pursue this course
he waived, as he had a right to do, the error."

Even those jurisdictions that have accepted the rule
that a case is submitted after charge, have found that
where counsel and the accused sit quietly by and allow
the jury to he separated, they have waived .any right to
complain. Thus, in Hobson v. State, 277 P.2d 695 (Okla.
Cr. 1954), the court allowed the jury to separate for lunch
after beginning their deliberations. The accused and
defense counsel remained silent while the trial judge
announced his intentions, and the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals found a waiver, noting:
"But in the ·within case there was no specific
waiver entered of reeord. Could there be a waiver
by implication~ The record is clear that both
counsel for the State and counsel for the defendant were present ·when the court announced his
intention of pern1itting the jurors to separate and
go to their separate places for lunch. No objection
was n1ade at the tin1e, as he:retofore reeited,
though there was full opportunity. The matter
of permitting the jurors to separate was a matter
of procedure, amounting to an irregularity, which
must be taken advantage of by exception. It is
true that the defendant had the right to have the
jury kept together after final submission until

12
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they agreed upon a verdict or were discharged by
the court, but the right coming within the classification of those rights that can be waived, as
heretofore determined, the defendant and his
counsel by failure to raise the question at the time
the court announced his intention of permitting
the jury to separate, are deemed to have acquiesced, and objections interposed for the first time
on a motion for new trial, came too late.''
Nor can appellant claim that he could not object without
offending the jury, since a prope·r objection could have
been made out of their hearing. Martin v. State, 222 P.2d
534 (Okla. Crim. 1950).
It is submitted that there is no merit to the appellant's contention of jury misconduct.
POINT Ill.
NO EVIDENCE OF ENTRAPMENT EXISTS WARRANTlNG REVERSAL.

The appellant's final contention is that his conviction
for all offenses should be set aside because his commission of the crimes was the result of entrapment. The evidence bearing on the issue of entrapment shows that some
time prior to the commission of the burglary and larceny
on 12 December 1960 at Payless Builders Supply, Officer
Gary Parks had several conversations with Gerald D.
Shelton, and that on the 11th of December, 1960, Shelton
told Parks that the defendant and Markham "had approached him with the idea of commiting a burglary.''
(R.128). The burglary was to be of Ream's Bargain
Center in South Salt Lake. (R. 128). Parks asked Shel-
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ton to verify the information as to the proposed robbery.
Parks testified that Shelton was not an undercover or
agent for the City Police. (R. 130, 131). Parks testified
that he did not receive any calls or notice from Shelton
as to the Payless burglary, but that he heard certain
information on the police radio that caused him to go to a
gas station where Shelton had left a note and then on to
the Payless Builders Supply Co. where the appellant,
Shelton and Markham had been apprehended. Parks had
been called by the appellant, and on cross-examination
testified as follows : (R. 136).
"BY J\1R. LEARY:
Q.

J\rfr. Parks, you are acquainted with Mr. Gery
Shelton, aren't you~ Gerald Shelton~

A. Yes.
Q.

Did you on Decemoor 11, 1960, ask 1fr. Shelton to set up a burglary so that Mr. Pacheco
and Mr. J\1arkham could be caught~

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did you encourage him in any way~

A.

No, sir.

* * *
Q.

Did you tell Mr. Shelton on the 11th day of
December or any day prior thereto, that :Mr.
Markham and J\1r. Pacheco, or induce J\1r.
Markham or :rvfr. Pacheco to burglarize Payless Builders Supply~

A.

No, sir.

* * *
Q.

Now did you induce Mr. Shelton to commit
the burglary on the Payless Builders Supply
in the summer of 1960 ~

14
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A.

No, sir.

Q. Did you suggest to him that he commit a burglary at the Payless Builders Supply~
A.

No, sir.

Q. Do you believe that he induced J\!Ir. Pacheco
to commit a burglary on the morning of December 12, 1960 ~
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Now, in truth and in fact, you suspected that
a burglary might be committed at Reams Bargain Annex on the night or morning of December 11th or 12th, 1960, didn't you~

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Now you had asked l\Ir. Shelton, had you not,
_Mr. Parks, if he had any information concerning any burglaries to notify you by phone,
is that correct~

A.

That's correct.

Q. And you therefore gave him your telephone
number, is that correct~
A.

That's correct. Yes.

Q. Did you make any promises to Mr. Shelton
concerning any crime that he may have participated in as to whether he would or would
not be prosecuted~
A.

No, sir.

Q.

That is all."

The substance of Officer Park's testimony was that
he told Shelton to keep him informed of possible burglaries that 1nay involve the appellant. (R.l41). Finally, on
redirect he testified: (R.142).
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'' Q.

A.

Did you at any time prior to the Payless
Builders Supply incident, use your influence
or the influence of your office to permit Gerry Shelton to continue his driving of his private vehicle~
No, sir."

The appellant testified that he was a convicted felon
(R. 144), and that he had conversations with Shelton
about the possibility of committing a crime. (R. 145). He
testified that he and Shelton had discussed burglarizing
the Equitable Life Insurance Co., Ream's Bargain Basement, and an A & W Root Beer stand, and that these
conversations took place on 11 December, 1960, the day
before the Payless Builders burglary. (R. 147). Later
that night Shelton contacted the appellant and asked
about the burglary, and appellant testified he told Shelton, "Not at this time," with reference to the burglary.
After a few moments of riding around in the appellant's
car, they arrived at Ream's Bargain Center. The appellant testified (R: 149') :
"A.

V\Then we got to Reams Bargain Center and I
said 'No,' and Johnny said 'No,' Gerry said,
'Well, ·what about the other one?' He said,
'What about the Payless Lumber?' And I
to1d him, 'Well, we'll go down there and see.' "

Appellant further testified it was Shelton who suggested
the possible burglaries (R. 151), but that the places
suggested were not favorable to him. (R. 152). On direct examination the follo·wing testimony was elicited:
(R.152).

"Q.

Now, 1\fr. Pacheco, when Mr. Shelton suggested that you go down to Rea1ns, and then
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when that didn't work that you go down to
Payless Builders Supply, what made you go
along with him~
A.

Well, partly because it was myself but three
fourths of it was his own reputation.

Q.

Mr. Shelton's

A.

That's right."

reputation~

On cross-examination, the appellant testified: (R. 157).
"Q.

A.

Well, what was your particular purpose in
breaking in there~
Well my purpose to break in there~

Q. Yes, your purpose.
A.

Because it was offered to you."

He testified to breaking and entering to steal money
(R. 158), and that he intended to avoid the police. He
testified : (R. 158).
"A.

What do you mean, I wouldn't have told
anybody about it~

Q.

Vvell

A.

I don't think anybody would have.

I mean you wouldn't have told any
officers about it~

* * *
Q. Well you just all went over there, and you
just broke in, is that right~
A.

No. I had been talking about it before."

Appellant testified further that he went on the burglary
because he ·was "asked to go," and further: (R.160).

''Q. And nobody forced you to go down there, did
they~

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

Nobody forced me to do anything.

Q.

And' you went down there because you wanted
to go down~

A.

I went down because I wanted to go down
there."

Appellant testified he was not offered money to commit
the burglary. (R. 161).
Gerald D. Shelton was also called as a defense witness and testified that he had a conversation with the
appellant the day before the burglary. He testified to
the substance of the conversation as follows: (R. 163).
''A.

Yes. He was talking, Ted, we was talking
about hitting some place, about burglarizing
some place, and I says, 'Okay, I'll go vnth
you.'

Q.

And that was the extent of the

A.

Yes.''

conversation~

Shelton further testified that he contacted Officer
Parks the day before the burglary and informed him of
the planned incident. Parks told him to go ahead, that
he would be protected. (R. 165). Shelton's testimony,
however, was that the appellant induced and conceived
of the burglary (R. 167), and that he just went along.
He testified on cross-examination that he never suggested
to the appellant or Markham the commission of the burglary. (R. 171). In this particular the record shows the
following: (R. 172).

"Q.

Did you ever encourage either Mr. Pacheco or
1\ir. I\iarkham to burglarize or attempt to
burglarize Reams Bargain Annex'
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A.

We had talked about it, but I never encouraged it.

Q. Did you ever suggest the burglary at Payless
Builders Supply Company 1
A.

No, I did not.

Q. Did you ever induce Mr. Pacheco to even
commit a burglary at the Payless on the
morning of December 12, 1960 ~
~1R. :MITSVNAGA: I object to that. I believe
it calls for a -

THE COURT: 1Nell, he may answer.
Q.

Did you ever encourage Mr. Pacheco to commit the burglary at the Payless Builders
Supply on the morning of December 12, 1960 ~

A.

No, I didn't. V\T e had talked about it but I
didn't encourage it.

Q.

\Vas it your idea that you burglarize the Payless Builders Supply Company on the morning of December 12, 1960 ~

A.

No.

Q.

When did you first talk about the burglary
of Payless Builders Supply~

A.

It was after this Reams Food Bargain Center
-Ted said he knew of another place that we
had hit before that he wanted to do.

And further: (R. 173).

''Q.

~Ir. Pacheco said 'I know of another place
that I burglarized before. Let's go do it? Is
that right~
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A.

That's right.

Q.

And you did go there, didn't you~

A.

Yes.

Q.

Now did :Mr. Parks of the Salt Lake City
Police Department tell you to induce Mr.
Pacheco to commit a burglary~

A.

No.

Q.

Did he tell you to encourage Mr. Pacheco-

A.

No.

Q.-to commit a burglary, any burglary~
A.

No, he did not.

Q.

Did he ever offer you any money if you encouraged or induced Mr. Pacheco to commit
any burglaries~

A.

No, he did not."

The substance of Shelton's testimony was that appellant
conceived of the burglary, and' that he, Shelton, went
along after informing the police, but that he did not encourage the burglary nor did Officer Parks encourage
him to encourage others to commit the crime.
The above testimony, it is submitted, conclusively
shows that no entrapment was comnritted, and that the
trial court gratuitously allowed an instruction on the
1natter where none was warranted.
In Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 40 Utah 448, 125 Pac.
657 (1912), the Supreme Court, although not characterizing the defense as one of "entrapment,'' set down a
silnilar substantive test as to when a conviction was to
be vitiated because of police inducement. The court said:
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''No doubt if public offices have induced or
procured a defendant to commit a burglary or larceny or other offense which he did not intend to
cOinmit nor would have committed except for
the induce1nent of such officer, public policy will
not justify a conviction for an offense committed
under such circumstances."
The rule followed in State v. McCornish, 59 Utah 58,
201 Pac. 637 ('19·21) ; and found not applicable to the facts
of State v. Franco, 76 Utah 202, 289 Pac. 100 (1930).
Thus it can be said that entrapment is a recognized' doctrine in U tah.1 The rule is the same as that applied in
other cases. In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958), the United States Supre:me Court stated:
"However, the fact that government agents
'merely afford opportunities or facilities for the
commission of the offense does not constitute entrapment. Entrapment occurs only when the
criminal conduct was the 'product of the creative
activity' of law enforcement officials."
r:rhe Nevada Supreme Court in In re Wright, 68 Nev.
324, 232 P.2d 398 (1951) defined entrapment as follows:
"Entrapinent is the seduction or improper
inducement to commit a crime for the purpose of
instituting a criminal prosecution, but if a person
1. Entrapment is not recognized in all jurisdictions. Thus
New York does not recognize it, People v. Schacher, 48 NYS 2d
371 (1944) nor Tennessee, Goins v. State, 192 Tenn. 32, 237 S.W.
2d 8 (1950). Florida has partially abolished it by statute, 22 Fla.
Stat. Ann., Sec. 838.11 (1957). It is questionable as to whether
several other common law purisdictions approve of the American
rule as such. Browning v. JWH Wats.on, 1 WLR 1172, 2 All E.R.
775 (195'3 England); Smith v. O'Donovan, 28 NZLR 94 (1908
New Zealand); Marsh v. Johnston (1959) Crim. L.R. 444 (Scotland) contra: R. v. Nothout (1912), CPD 1037 (South AF).
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in good faith and for the purpose of detecting
or discovering a crime or offense furnishes the
opportunity for the commission thereof by one
who has the requisite criminal intent it is not entrapment."
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the concept of entrapment in Crosbie v. State, 330
P.2d 602 (1958 Okla. Cr.) as follows:
"Entrapment is the planning of an offense
by an officer, or someone acting under his direction, and his procurement by improper inducement
of its commission by one who would not have
perpetrated it except for the trickery of the officer.''
Thus there appear to be two essential elements to the defense of entrapment: (1) the unlawful inducement, and
( 2) the commission of the crime as the direct result of the
trickery and not the result of a willingness or preconceived criminal intent. United States v. Sherman, 200 F.
2d 880 (1952). In determining whether the police inducement provided the unlawful intent, Justice Learned Hand
said in United States v. Sherman, 200 F. 2d 880, 882:
"(I)t is a valid reply to the defense, if the
prosecution can satisfy the jury that the accused
was ready and willing to commit the offense
charged, whenever the opportunity offered."
It is also the generally accepted rule in the n1ajority
of jurisdictions that evidence of previous convictions
and misconduct of the same may be considered in determining the "ready cmnpliance" or "criminal design" of
the defendant. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
451 (1932); 49 Jnl. Crim. & Pol. Sci., 447, 450.
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By applying the above noted rules to the instant
situation, it appears clear that the defendant was not
entrapped. Both Officer Parks and Gerald Shelton testified that the original idea to burglarize Reams market
and Payless Builders came from the defendant. Both
testified that they in no way encouraged the crimes to
be comn1itted. The defendant's own testimony shows that
he was not forced to go along, but committed the crimes
readily because he was "asked to." He was not induced
over a long period of time, but rather, assuming that
Shelton suggested the idea, the appeilant readily complied. His objection to burglarizing Reams Market was
not because of a lack of criminal desire, but rather be'""
cause he felt Payless Builders would be better. The issue
of entrapn1ent is one for the jury, United States v. Markham, 191 F. 2d 936 (1951), unless as a matter of l'aw it
appears that entrapment was present. United States v.
Sherman, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). The jury could well have
believed Parks and Shelton that the criminal conduct
originated ·with the appellant; hence sufficient evidence
to sustain the conviction in spite of the entrapment plea
exists, and the jury's decision must be upheld. Berchtold
r. State, 11 Ftah 208, 357 P. 2d 183 (1960). Even were the
appellant's testimony believed in full, the second element
for the defense of entrapment is expressly negatived by
appellant's ready compliance. For this reason the trial
court's instruction placing the defense in issue for the
jury was a mere gratuity, as the issue was not raised
as a matter of law.
The evidence is similar in the instant case to that
before the court in People v. Malone, 117 Cal. App. 629,
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4 P. 2d 287 (1931), where the court held that no entrapment existed. It is submitted, therefore, that the claim
of entrapment is not well taken.

CONCLUSION
The appellant's claims show no basis for reversal of
his convictions, and it is submitted the conviction should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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